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Obsessive–compulsive disorderLikelihood thought–action fusion (TAF-L) refers to a cognitive bias in which individuals believe that the mere
thought of a negative event increases its likelihood of occurring in reality. TAF-L is most commonly associated
with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) but is also present in depression, generalized anxiety disorder and
psychosis. We induced TAF-L in individuals with high (High-OC, N = 23) and low (Low-OC, N = 24) levels of
OC traits, and used low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) to localise the accompanying electrical
brain activity patterns. The results showed greater TAF-L in the High-OC than in the Low-OC group (p b .005),
which was accompanied by signiﬁcantly greater upper beta frequency (19–30 Hz) activity in the precuneus
(p b .05). Further, the precuneus activity was positively correlated with self-reported magnitude of TAF-L
(p b .01), suggesting a speciﬁc role of this region in this cognitive bias. Results are discussed with reference to
self-referential processing and the default-mode network.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Thought–action fusion, or TAF (Rachman, 1993; Shafran et al., 1996),
is a cognitive bias in which an individual believes that thoughts and
actions are inextricably linked. This bias takes two forms: Moral TAF
(TAF-M) and Likelihood TAF (TAF-L). TAF-M refers to the belief that
thinking an unacceptable or immoral thought is the moral equivalent
of performing an unacceptable or immoral action (Shafran et al.,
1996); for example, if a mother experiences an intrusive thought that
she is going to harm her child, she may feel that she is as morally re-
sponsible as if she had harmed her child in reality. TAF-L, on the other
hand, refers to the belief that thoughts have causal powers. In this
form of TAF it is believed that thinking of a negative or disturbing
event makes it more likely to occur in reality (Shafran et al., 1996); for
example, a husband who experiences a thought of his wife being
involved in a car accident may believe that his thought has made the
event more likely to transpire. TAF-L can be further divided into
Likelihood-self (TAF-LS), referring to the belief that one's thoughts will
cause harm to oneself, and Likelihood-other (TAF-LO) – the more
pathological of the two (Shafran and Rachman, 2004) – referring toerms of the Creative Commons
rmits non-commercial use, dis-
original author and source are
gy, University of Winchester,
Jones).
lished by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserthe belief that one's thoughts will be the cause of harm to others
(Shafran et al., 1996).
Patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) are particularly
prone to TAF (Meyer and Brown, 2012; Shafran et al., 1996), which
appears to be strongly associated with the inﬂated sense of responsibil-
ity often found in this patient group (see Salkovskis, 1985). However,
recent evidence suggests that TAF is not only conﬁned to OCD, but is
also found in patient groups with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)
(Thompson-Hollands et al., 2013), major depressive disorder (Hossein
et al., 2012), and schizophrenia (Kabakci et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the experience of TAF is correlated with psychopatho-
logical symptoms in the normal population; so far there have been
accounts of TAF correlating with non-clinical symptoms of OCD (Amir
et al., 2001; Muris et al., 2001), GAD (Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2002; Muris
et al., 2001), schizotypy (Lee et al., 2005; Muris and Merckelbach, 2003)
and depression (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2001; Rachman
et al., 1995; Rassin et al., 2001; Shafran and Rachman, 2004). Reports
also suggest that the sub-scalemost strongly associatedwithOCD, anxiety
and schizotypy is TAF-L (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Amir et al., 2001;
Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2005; Meyer and Brown, 2012;
Thompson-Hollands et al., 2013), with some suggesting that TAF-M
may be more strongly related to depression (Abramowitz et al., 2003);
correlation coefﬁcients of 0.21, 0.23, and 0.13 between obsessive–
compulsive symptoms and TAF-total, TAF-L, and TAF-M have been
reported by two separate studies (Rassin et al., 2000a, 2001).
However, evidence suggests that while TAF may be a contributing
factor in a variety of other disorders, its strongest inﬂuence is in OCD
(Muris et al., 2001). As expressed in Rassin et al. (2000b, p.762), TAF
“seems to be similar to that of attentional bias, which is also aved.
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its ramiﬁcations might be greater in some conditions than in others”.
Similarly, Starcevic and Berle (2006) suggested that TAF, along with
other anxiety-related phenomena such as anxiety sensitivity, patholog-
ical worry, and intolerance of uncertainty, may be “pathognomonic”, i.e.
common to a number of disorders, rather than isolated to one disorder in
particular. These authors also drew a parallel between TAF and psychotic
symptoms such as delusions of reference or passivity phenomena.
Further to ﬁndings of TAF in psychiatric disorders, it appears that
TAF is also found in child populations. It has long been suggested that
magical thinking tendencies occur during normal child development
(Piaget, 1929/1973), and TAF appears to be one of such tendencies.
Evans et al. (2011) found that TAF was endorsed to a greater extent
by younger than older children, in an examination of three age groups
(mean ages of 7.8, 9.6 and 12 years). Their results also suggested that
an extended phase of TAF endorsement in childhood is associated
with greater anxiety and ritualistic tendencies. Thus it is suggested
that while TAF endorsement appears to be a normal phase of develop-
ment in childhood, carrying these beliefs into early adolescence may
represent a risk factor for later anxiety problems.
Despite this wealth of evidence showing TAF to be an important
characteristic in a wide range of psychiatric disorders, and potentially
a developmental predictor of psychopathology in later life, to our
knowledge there has not been any investigation of its neural basis. Yet
ﬁnding the neural basis of TAF would increase knowledge of how
biological mechanisms inﬂuence psychiatric symptoms, and may also
have a more practical clinical utility; for example, these regions could
beuseful as sites for non-invasive stimulationmethods such as transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS). TDCS has proved helpful in the
treatment of some psychiatric disorders (see Kuo et al., 2013), and
could potentially be used in conjunctionwith psychotherapy for greater
effectiveness; there have been reports of a synergistic effect from
combined tDCS and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) leading to a
long-lasting improvement in drug-resistant depression (D'Urso et al.,
2013). As a common step in cognitive therapy for OCD involves address-
ing the endorsement of TAF by patients (Radomsky et al., 2010),
concurrent stimulation may enhance the ‘un-learning’ of this cognitive
bias that the therapy hopes to achieve.
The present study aimed to ﬁll this gap by recording EEG signals
of participants with high- and low-OC symptoms undergoing a modiﬁ-
cation of the classic TAF-induction paradigm (Rachman et al., 1996).
In the original TAF-induction experiment (Rachman et al., 1996),
participantswere asked to keep inmind a close friend or relative, before
copying the sentence “I hope that ____ will be in a car accident”, and
inserting the name of their chosen loved one into the blank space.
Subsequently, they were instructed to close their eyes and imagine
the accident for ‘a few seconds’. As a result, participants experienced
feelings of anxiety, guilt, the urge to neutralize (or ‘cancel out’ what
they had just done), and believed that the likelihood of the event occur-
ring had increased. Since its initial inception, this paradigm has been
replicated – with various modiﬁcations – a number of times in order
to examine the relationship between TAF and thought suppression
(Marcks and Woods, 2007; Rassin, 2001), and neutralization (Bocci
and Gordon, 2007; Van den Hout et al., 2001, 2002), and the efﬁcacy
of anti-TAF interventions (Zucker et al., 2002). The procedure of the
current experiment deviated slightly from the original in the two fol-
lowing ways: Firstly we asked our participants to make a short list of
their close friends/family prior to TAF-induction. This ensured that par-
ticipants could think of loved ones for all four trials, and provided a
check that participants were using the name of someone they were
truly close to. Secondly, while participants were still required to have
their eyes closed for a few seconds after repeating the sentence, we
did not give any instructions at this point to visualise the event occur-
ring; this allowed spontaneous brain activity occurring in response to
the TAF induction – in the absence of any further instructions – to be
recorded.Given TAF's pathognomonic nature, we expected activation of those
brain regions inwhich abnormalities are common inmultiple psychiatric
disorders, spanning OCD, depression, anxiety and psychosis. Additional-
ly, we expected that the neural activity accompanying TAF would reﬂect
its composite cognitive and emotional elements (e.g. agency, causal rea-
soning, responsibility, guilt, etc.). We therefore hypothesised an activa-
tion of either the precuneus or the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC);
recent ﬁndings have implicated both of these regions in the self-
attribution of cause for (hypothetical) harmful consequences (Cabanis
et al., 2012; Morey et al., 2012), a process seemingly very similar to
TAF. Furthermore, previous research has provided evidence for the in-
volvement of both the precuneus (Fusar-Poli et al., 2011; Piras et al.,
2013; Rotge et al., 2008; Strawn et al., 2013) and the mPFC (Grieve
et al., 2013; Piras et al., 2013) in numerous psychiatric disorders.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
The current analysis combined samples from two separate experi-
ments. Both sample 1 (N = 29, 14 High-OC, 19 females) and sample 2
(N = 18, 9 High-OC, 14 females) began each experimental block with
the TAF-induction procedure outlined below, but subsequent block ac-
tivities differed, with sample 1 continuing to engage in visualisation of
the TAF-induction's negative event (Jones and Bhattacharya, 2012),
and sample 2 continuing to engage in a low-level sensory perception
task (unpublished data). The samples did not differ signiﬁcantly in age
(F(1, 45) = 1.89, p = .18), OCI-R score (F(1, 45) = .86, p = .36), or
MIS score (F(1, 45) = .51, p = .48).
In order to account for any inﬂuence of these differing activities,
samplewas included as a covariate in all analyses.
Volunteers were recruited through word of mouth and advertising
in Goldsmiths, University of London, andwere sent theObsessive–Com-
pulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) (Foa et al., 2002) by e-mail. Those
whose OCI-R scores were below the threshold of the Low-OC cut-off,
or above the threshold of the High-OC cut off, were chosen to take
part in the EEG study. Participants were chosen on the basis of their
scores on the OCI-R. Participants were designated as High-OC if their
total score on theOCI-Rwas equal to or higher than 21, which is the rec-
ommended clinical cut-off for OCD (Foa et al., 2002), and has been used
as a High-OC boundary in other studies using analogue OCD groups
(Cavanagh et al., 2010; Gründler et al., 2009). An arbitrary cut-off of
10 was set as the maximum total score for Low-OCs. Forty-nine partic-
ipants took part in total, and 12 of them (7 High-OC) received a small
cash incentive. Twoparticipants, 1High-OCand 1 Low-OC,were exclud-
ed from the analysis as their OCI-R score had changed considerably from
the time of e-mail screening to the time of testing, at which point their
scores no longer ﬁt into either group. Therefore the data of 47 partici-
pants were included in the ﬁnal analysis (23 High-OC; 24 Low-OC).
The OCI-R score of the High-OC group (32.4 ± 6.8) was signiﬁcantly
higher (F(1, 44) = 302.08, p b .0001) than that of the Low-OC group
(5.4 ± 4.0). Participant's demographics and OCI-R subscale scores are
shown in Table 1.
The majority of participants were female, but there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference in sex distribution between the High-OC and Low-OC
groups (χ2 (2, 47) = .30, p = .59). Three participants (2 High-OC, 1
Low-OC) were undergoing pharmacological treatment with Citalopram
for depression; all remaining participants reported that they had
not been diagnosed with any mental health condition and were not
undergoing treatment.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R)
As mentioned earlier, the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) was used to form
two groups of participants, onewith low levels of obsessive–compulsive
Table 1
Means and standard deviations of High-OC and Low-OC group scores for the Obsessive–
Compulsive Inventory-Revised and Magical Ideation Scale, and age and sex.
High-OC Low-OC
N = 23 N = 24
Age (years) 25.4 ± 4.3 25.2 ± 3.1
Males/females 6/17 8/16
OCI-R total Score 32.4 ± 6.8 5.4 ± 4.0
Hoarding 5.7 ± 3.5 2.1 ± 2.0
Checking 6.0 ± 2.5 0.8 ± 1.3
Ordering 7.0 ± 3.0 1.0 ± 1.2
Neutralizing 4.3 ± 3.3 0.3 ± 0.7
Cleaning 3.0 ± 3.1 0.3 ± 0.9
Obsessing 6.5 ± 3.8 1.0 ± 1.4
MIS 9.0 ± 5.2 2.6 ± 4.3
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symptoms (High-OC). This is a self-report measure consisting of 18-
items assessing distress caused by obsessive–compulsive symptoms in
the past month (e.g. “I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light
switches after turning them off”). The scale assesses 6 symptom
dimensions: hoarding, checking, ordering, cleaning, obsessing, and
neutralizing. Participants completed the OCI-R on two separate occa-
sions: ﬁrst at screening and second at baseline prior to TAF-induction.
2.2.2. Magical Ideation Scale
The Magical Ideation Scale, MIS (Eckblad and Chapman, 1983) was
developed to be an indication of schizotypy. The scale is a self-report
measure which contains 30 statements to assess individuals' beliefs of
causality (e.g. “Some people can make me aware of them just by think-
ing about me”). The MIS score of the High-OC group was signiﬁcantly
higher than that of the Low-OC group (F(1, 44) = 21.1, p b .001), see
Table 1.
2.2.3. Visual Analogue Scales
Four Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were used during the TAF-
induction procedure on which participants indicated their level of anx-
iety, guilt, their urge to neutralize, and their estimation of the likelihood
of the event referred to in each TAF-induction trial occurring in reality.
These VAS were presented on screen, and participants used their
keypad to move a yellow bar in increasing increments (maximum 10)
along the scale, marked from “not at all” (score of 0) up to “very
much” (score of 10).
2.3. Procedure
Prior to beginning the study, all participants were informed that the
procedure would most likely induce transient feelings of anxiety and
guilt, and that they may withdraw from participating at any time.
After giving informed consent, participants completed the MIS and the
OCI-R, and gave an indication of their baseline level of anxiety on the
anxiety VAS. Participants were then asked to write a short list of close
friends and family, for later insertion into the sentence stimuli. The
study was carried out at Goldsmiths, University of London and was ap-
proved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology at
Goldsmiths.
2.3.1. Thought–action fusion induction
The TAF-induction procedure was similar to that of Rachman et al.
(1996), in which participants were required to insert the name of a
loved one into the sentence “I hope that ___ is in a car accident”. The cur-
rent manipulation was composed of four trials, and used four TAF-
induction sentences—matched for similar negative valence froma larger
list by an independent sample of 25 undergraduates from Goldsmiths,University of London (21 females, mean age = 19.4 ± 1.8 years). The
sentence stimuli were:
1. I hope that _____ will be in a serious car accident soon
2. I hope that _____ will lose their home soon
3. I hope that _____ will become seriously ill soon
4. I hope that _____ will lose a close family member soon.
The order of presentation of the sentence stimuli was randomized
across participants. Each trial began with the presentation of a sentence
stimulus on screen. Participants then closed their eyes before repeating
the sentence aloud, inserting a name from their list of family and
friends. Three seconds after sentence repetition, a beep sounded to in-
form participants to open their eyes, and VAS scales were completed
on screen. VAS scales assessed participant's levels of anxiety, guilt,
urge to neutralize and perceived likelihood of the event occurring.
2.4. EEG recording
Sixty-four channel EEG signalswere continuously recorded by active
scalp electrodes according to the extended 10–20 International system
of electrode placement (Jasper, 1958). Additional electrodes were
placed above and below each eye, and at the outer canthus of each
eye, to record vertical and horizontal eye movements, respectively.
The EEG signals were ampliﬁed by BioSemi Active Two® ampliﬁers
and ﬁltered between 0.6 and 100 Hz. The sampling rate was 512 Hz.
2.5. EEG data analysis
The EEG data was algebraically re-referenced to the average of two
earlobes. Notch ﬁlter at 50 Hz was applied to remove line-noise inter-
ference. Reading phase epochs were extracted from the point immedi-
ately following the repetition of the sentence stimuli aloud by the
participants (marked with a key press by the experimenter) and lasting
for 3 s. Any epochs containing large artefacts due to eye-blinks or
muscle movements were rejected based on visual inspection. All data
pre-processing and visualisation were carried out using the MATLAB®
based toolbox, EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004).
As only 4 reading phase epochs were available per participant, these
3-second epochs were subdivided into three 1 second epochs, thus
allowing for maximumpreservation of data following artefact rejection.
In order to ensure that this method did not affect results, analyses were
re-run at a later time with the full three second epochs, and no signiﬁ-
cant differences between the ﬁndings using each method were present.
A univariate ANOVA, with sample as a covariate, showed no signiﬁcant
difference (F(1, 44) = 2.74, p = .11) between the average number of
epochs available for the Low-OC group (10.4 ± 3.3) and those available
for the High-OC group (8.9 ± 3.0).
The periodogram of the EEG data was estimated by the Welch
method (Welch, 1967) using a 192-point Hanning window with a 50%
overlap. The periodogram was separately estimated for each electrode
and condition for each participant. Spectral power was then averaged
for each of the following frequency bands: theta (2–6 Hz), alpha
(8–12 Hz), beta-1 (14–18 Hz), beta-2 (19–21 Hz), and beta-3
(22–30 Hz); spectral power values were log-transformed to reduce
variance.
2.6. Statistical analysis of EEG data in electrode space
For regional power analysis,mean bandpowerwas calculated for six
ROIs: left frontal (Fp1, AF3, AF7, F3, F5, F7), left central (FC5, FC3, FC1,
C1, C3, C5, CP5, CP3, CP1), left posterior (P1, P3, P5, P7, PO3, PO7, O1),
right frontal (Fp2, AF4, AF8, F2, F4, F6, F8), right central (FC2, FC4, FC6,
C2, C4, C6, CP2, CP4, CP6), and right posterior (P2, P4, P6, P8, PO4,
PO8, O2). Regional power analysis was carried out usingmixed factorial
ANCOVAs with Hemisphere (left, right) and Region (frontal, central, and
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between-subjects factor, and Sample as a covariate.
Partial Spearman's correlations were examined between EEG power
and VAS responses, controlling for the effect of sample.
2.7. Source localization
Low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) computes
the inverse solution within a three-shell spherical Talairach head
model (Talairach and Tourboux, 1988), with the solution space restrict-
ed to cortical grey matter and the hippocampus, as determined by the
corresponding digitized probability atlas from the Brain Imaging Centre,
Montreal Neurologic Institute. A spatial resolution of 7 mm is used,
producing 2394 voxels.
The LORETA-KEY software package (Pascual-Marqui, 1999; Pascual-
Marqui et al., 1994, 2002) was used to compute average current source
density for the two EEG frequency bands in which signiﬁcant effects
were found in electrode space (beta-2, beta-3) for each participant.
The differences between the two groups' brain activity were ﬁrst
analysed using the LORETA-KEY software, through voxel-by-voxel inde-
pendent t-tests of the log-transformed current source density (Frei
et al., 2001). This standard analysis is based on estimating the empirical
probability distribution of the maximum t statistic under the null
hypothesis, via 5000 randomisations, and corrects for multiple compar-
isons of all 2394 voxels (see Nicols and Holmes, 2002 for details on this
permutation procedure). Further analysis of signiﬁcant clusters was
carried out in IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, version 20 (2011)
using partial Spearman's correlations.
2.8. Behavioural analysis
MeanVAS responses for the entire sample (24 Low-OC, 23High-OC)
were entered into a mixed factorial ANOVA with VAS (anxiety, guilt,
likelihood, urge) as a within-subjects factor, Group (High-OC, Low-OC)
as a between-subjects factor, and Sample as a covariate. PartialFig. 1.Mean VAS responses for anxiety, guilt, likelihooSpearman's correlations were used to examine the relationship be-
tween VAS responses and participants' scores on the OCI-R and MIS.
3. Results
A univariate ANCOVA showed the initial anxiety ratings of the Low-
OC group (1.7 ± 1.8) and the High-OC group (2.0 ± 1.6) did not differ
signiﬁcantly (F(1, 44) = .39, p = .54).
3.1. Behavioural effects of TAF-induction
A highly signiﬁcantmain effect ofGroup (F(1, 44) = 13.6, p = .001)
showed that the High-OC group gave higher VAS responses for the four
measures combined. No interaction of VAS × Group was present (F(3,
132) = 1.61, p = .19), suggesting the group difference to be consistent
across measures. However, analysis of individual VAS measures
suggests the group difference to be smaller on the VAS of anxiety (F(1,
44) = 5.00, p = .03,), than those of guilt (F(1, 44) = 11.42,
p = .002), likelihood (F(1, 44) = 9.23, p = .004), or urge to neutralize
(F(1, 44) = 10.33, p = .002), as shown in Fig. 1.
The correlation analysis based on partial Spearman's correlation re-
vealed that participants' VAS responses of guilt, perceived likelihood
and urge to neutralize, were positively correlated with their scores on
both the OCI-R and MIS (Table 2). The checking subscale of the OCI-R
showed the strongest relationship with VAS responses, with correlation
coefﬁcients of .43 (p b .01), .47 (p b .01), and .45 (p b .01) with guilt,
likelihood and urge, respectively. This was followed by the MIS, which
had correlation coefﬁcients of .32 (p b 05), .56 (p b .01) and .41
(p b .01). Total OCI-R score showed a weak relationship only with
anxiety (ρ = .30, p b .05).
3.2. Regional EEG power analysis
No signiﬁcant group differences were found in the theta, alpha or
beta-1 bands. In the beta-2 band, we found a signiﬁcant interaction ofd and urge to neutralize following TAF-induction.
Table 2
Partial Spearman's correlations (controlling for sample) between OCI-R total and sub-
scales, MIS and VAS responses following TAF-induction.
Anxiety Guilt Perceived likelihood Urge to neutralize
Checking ns .43⁎⁎ .47⁎⁎ .45⁎⁎
Ordering ns .35⁎ .32⁎ ns
Neutralizing ns .32⁎ .36⁎ .35⁎
Cleaning ns ns .30⁎ ns
Obsessing ns ns .50⁎⁎ .34⁎
Total .32⁎ .43⁎⁎ .48⁎⁎ .47⁎⁎
MIS ns .32⁎ .56⁎⁎ .41⁎⁎
ns: non-signiﬁcant.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
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in the High-OC group (F(2, 42) = 4.41, p = .02) suggests a greater
beta-2 power in posterior than frontal regions, while the Low-OC
group showed no topographical differences in beta-2 distribution
(p N .05), as shown in Fig. 2a.
Similar results were found in the beta-3 band where the interaction
of Region × Group was signiﬁcant in centro-posterior regions (F(1,Fig. 2. a. Topographical maps showing log-transformed beta-2 power in the High-OC group (
correlation between log-transformed beta-2 power at electrode P9 and self-reported guilt follo44) = 4.23, p = .05). In the Low-OC group this reﬂected lower beta-3
power in posterior region than in central region (F(1, 22) = 7.94,
p = .01), while the High-OC group once again exhibited greater beta-
3 power in posterior region than in frontal region (F(1, 21) = 4.76,
p = .04).
Spearman's correlations revealed a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between beta-2 and beta-3 power in parietal electrodes, and partici-
pants' VAS responses following TAF-induction (see Table 3). The
strongest relationships were observed with VAS responses for guilt
(Fig. 2b), while anxiety only showed a weak relationship with activity
in electrode P5 (ρ = .29, p b .05).3.3. Source localisation results
Whole-brain analysis revealed signiﬁcantly greater beta-2 and beta-
3 activity in parieto-occipital regions of the High-OC group compared
with the Low-OC group (see Fig. 3a). Signiﬁcant differences in both
bands were found primarily in the precuneus, and in the beta-2 band
there were also signiﬁcant differences in the cingulate gyrus, posterior
cingulate, and cuneus. Table 4 provides Talairach co-ordinates and tleft) and the Low-OC group (right) following TAF-induction. b. Scatterplot showing the
wing TAF-induction.
Table 3
Partial Spearman's correlations (controlling for sample) between beta 2 andbeta 3 powers
in parietal electrodes, and VAS responses following TAF-induction.
P5 P7 P9 P6 P8 P10 PO8
Beta 2
Anxiety .29⁎
Guilt .29⁎ .33⁎ .42⁎⁎ .37⁎ .36⁎
Likelihood .40⁎⁎ .37⁎ .33⁎ .37⁎ .32⁎ .29⁎
Urge to neutralize .36⁎
Beta 3
Anxiety
Guilt .29⁎ .33⁎ .39⁎⁎ .36⁎ .30⁎ .29⁎
Likelihood .32⁎ .33⁎ .29⁎
Urge to neutralize .37⁎ .30⁎
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
Table 4
Source localization of current source density comparisons between High-OC and Low-OC
groups following TAF-induction.
Primary lobe Region Cluster size Brodmann's
area(s)
Peak voxel (Talairach
coordinates)
Left Right BA t x y z
Beta 2
Occipital Cuneus 4 2 7, 18, 19 t = 3.11 −3 −67 29
Limbic Cingulate
gyrus
1 1 31 t = 3.04 −3 −60 29
Parietal Precuneus 19 22 7, 19, 31 t = 3.46 −10 −74 43
Beta 3
Parietal Precuneus 9 2 7, 19 t = 3.00 −3 −74 43
CG = cingulate gyrus; Cu = cuneus; PCu = precuneus.
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cluster.
Partial Spearman's correlations revealed highly signiﬁcant positive
relationships between this beta-2 and beta-3 activity andVAS responses
of participants following TAF-induction, with the strongest relation-
ships observed between guilt and precuneus beta-2 (ρ = .51,
p b .001) and beta-3 (ρ = .52, p b .001), and urge to neutralize and
precuneus beta-3 (ρ = .54, p b .001), as shown in Fig. 3b. Positive
relationships were also seen between this activity and participants'
questionnaire scores (see Table 5), with particularly strong correlations
between MIS score and precuneus beta-3 (ρ = .54, p b .001), and total
OCI-R score and precuneus beta-2 (ρ = .51, p b .001).Fig. 3. a. Beta-2 current sourcedensity in a contrast ofHigh-OC vs. Low-OC participants following
current source density in the precuneus (left) and between TAF-induced urge to neutralize an3.4. Comparison of separate experimental samples
In order to ensure that the use of two combined experimental
samples did not inﬂuence our results, statistical analyses of differences
between the two samples were run on baseline and TAF induced
measures. A univariate ANOVA with Sample and Group as between-
subjects factors showed no signiﬁcant difference in initial anxiety be-
tween the two samples (F(1, 43) = 1.30, p = .26) and no interaction
between Sample and Group (F(1, 43) = .003, p = .96). There were
also no signiﬁcant differences between the two samples in TAF-
induced anxiety (F(1, 43) = 2.48, p = .12), guilt (F(1, 43) = .03,
p = .86), likelihood (F(1, 43) = 1.57, p = .22) or urge to neutralize
(F(1, 43) = .58, p = .45). Neither were there any signiﬁcant interac-
tions between Sample and Group in TAF-induced anxiety (F(1,TAF-induction. b. Scatterplots showing correlations betweenTAF-induced guilt andbeta-2
d beta-3 current source density in the precuneus (right).
Table 5
Partial Spearman's correlations (controlling for sample) between Beta 2 andBeta 3 current
source density and VAS responses following TAF induction, and participants' scores on the
Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory-Revised and Magical Ideation Scale.
Cingulate
Beta 2
Cuneus
Beta 2
Precuneus
Beta 2
Precuneus
Beta 3
VAS responses
Anxiety .43⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .45⁎⁎
Guilt .45⁎⁎ .50⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎⁎ .52⁎⁎⁎
Likelihood .40⁎⁎ .43⁎⁎ .48⁎⁎ .44⁎⁎
Urge to neutralize .44⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .54⁎⁎⁎
MIS .49⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎⁎ .54⁎⁎⁎
OCI-R subscales
Hoarding .29⁎ n.s .29⁎ .30⁎
Checking .30⁎ .30⁎ .33⁎ .35⁎
Ordering .35⁎ .35⁎ .42⁎⁎ .30⁎
Neutralizing .35⁎ .37⁎ .40⁎⁎ .30⁎
Cleaning .40⁎⁎ .37⁎ .36⁎ .34⁎
Obsessing .39⁎⁎ .38⁎⁎ .49⁎⁎ .38⁎
Total OCI-R .47⁎⁎ .45⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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43) = .25, p = .62), or urge to neutralize (F(1, 43) = .01, p = .94).
Analysis of EEG power also showed no signiﬁcant interaction of
Sample with Region in the beta-2 (F(2, 86) = .28, p = .76) or beta-3
(F(2, 86) = .83, p = .44) bands. Neither were there any signiﬁcant in-
teractions between Sample, Region and Group in the beta-2 (F(2,
86) = 1.17, p = .32) or beta-3 (F(2, 86) = 2.59, p = .09) bands.
Furthermore, analysis of LORETA current source density showed no
signiﬁcant differences between samples in precuneus beta-2 (F(1,
43) = 1.32, p = .26) or beta-3 (F(1, 43) = .69, p = .41), cingulate
beta-2 (F(1, 43) = .12, p = .73) or cuneus beta-2 (F(1, 43) = 1.33,
p = .25) activity. Further there were no signiﬁcant interactions be-
tween Sample and Group in precuneus beta-2 (F(1, 43) = .05,
p = .83) or beta-3 (F(1, 43) = .11, p = .74), cingulate beta-2 (F(1,
43) = .20, p = .65) or cuneus beta-2 (F(1, 43) = .05, p = .83) activity.
These altogether clearly justiﬁed the combining of two samples.
4. Discussion
The principle purpose of the current study was to investigate the
neural correlates of thought–action fusion (TAF) by analysing EEG activ-
ity accompanying TAF-induction in individuals with high (High-OC)
compared to low (Low-OC) levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms.
Signiﬁcantly greater levels of TAF were induced in the High-OC com-
pared to the Low-OC group, as shown by higher responses on Visual An-
alogue Scales (VAS) of anxiety, guilt, urge to neutralize, and estimations
of likelihood of the negative events occurring. Analysis of EEG activity in
the electrode space showed signiﬁcant differences in the topographical
distribution of beta-2 and beta-3 activity between the two groups
during TAF-induction, with the High-OC group showing a greater
concentration of this activity in posterior regions. Correlation analysis
showed this posterior beta activity to be positively related with all
VAS measures. Source analysis found group differences in posterior
beta-2 and beta-3 activity, with signiﬁcantly greater activity present in
a large area of the precuneus in the High-OC group compared to the
Low-OCgroup. Strong correlationswere observed between beta activity
in the precuneus and all VAS measures, particularly with self-reported
likelihood, guilt and urge to neutralize; thus suggesting a speciﬁc role
of the precuneus in thought–action fusion.
The precuneus resides in the medial posterior parietal cortex,
and has rich anatomical and functional connections to widespread
brain regions (Zhang and Li, 2012). There is an extreme diversity of
function associatedwith this structure, including awide-range of higher
order cognitive functions (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), and it is amajorconstituent of the brain's ‘default mode network’ or DMN (Gusnard and
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). The reason for its vast plethora of
functions has been accredited to its high centrality in the cortical net-
work, in which it acts as a ‘hub’ between parietal and prefrontal regions
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009).
Previous studies outlining its involvement in psychopathology as
well as its various functions strongly support the results of the current
experiment in ascribing the precuneus a pivotal role in thought–action
fusion.
4.1. The precuneus in OCD, schizophrenia, anxiety and depression
While rarely mentioned in the models of OCD or discussed in detail
in meta-analyses, a large proportion of neuroimaging studies have
found abnormalities in precuneus structure and function in OCD popu-
lations. For example, reductions in precuneus grey matter have been
found in OCD patients compared with controls in both adult (Soriano-
Mas et al., 2007) and paediatric samples (Carmona et al., 2007), while
Van den Heuvel et al. (2009) found positive correlations between the
left precuneus grey matter and the harm/checking symptoms. Rotge
et al.'s meta-analysis of 8 fMRI OCD symptom provocation studies
found signiﬁcant activation of the left precuneus (Rotge et al., 2008).
Similarly, Menzies et al. (2008) found signiﬁcant activation of the left
precuneus in their meta-analysis of fMRI studies comparing OCD pa-
tients and controls during task performance (Menzies et al., 2008). It
has also been found that regional cerebral blood ﬂow (rCBF) to the
precuneus is signiﬁcantly reduced in OCD following successful
cognitive-behavioural therapy, further supporting a relationship with
symptoms (Berk et al., 2009).Moreover, evidence suggests that OCDpa-
tients have alterations in the functional relationship between the DMN
and the more ‘task positive’ networks, such as the fronto-parietal net-
work, so that the DMN does not ‘switch off’ during task processing as
would normally be expected (Stern et al., 2011). Stern et al. (2012)
found a reduction of negative correlations between the two networks
in patients compared with controls, and found patients to have
hyperconnectivity between the left anterior insula and the posterior
cingulate/precuneus.
The precuneus has also been strongly implicated in schizophrenia.
Structural studies have reported abnormal connectivity of the
precuneus of patient groups (Cheung et al., 2008) and also cortical thin-
ning of the precuneus (Narr et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2010). Reduced
grey matter in the left precuneus has been observed in a large voxel-
basedmorphometry study of individuals at high genetic risk for psycho-
sis comparedwith controls (Fusar-Poli et al., 2011), suggesting this to be
a potential biomarker. Functional experiments, with particular
relevance to TAF, have shown increased activity in the precuneus of
schizophrenic patient groups during attribution tasks, suggested to re-
ﬂect automatic self-reﬂection, and to accompany delusions of reference
(Menon et al., 2011). Delusions of reference refers to the endorsement,
normally found in schizophrenic patients, that generic stimuli are
related to themselves. As previously mentioned, parallels have been
drawn between TAF and delusions of reference (Starcevic and Berle,
2006), both of which involve misattributions of personal signiﬁcance,
so it is interesting to see that precuneus activity has been found to
accompany this phenomenon.
In GAD, abnormal connectivity has been observed between the pos-
terior cingulate and precuneus and prefrontal cortices (Strawn et al.,
2012), and signiﬁcantly greater right precuneus volume has been
found in adolescents with GAD compared with healthy controls
(Strawn et al., 2013). Further, in young adults a positive relationship
has been found between cortical thickness of the precuneus/PCC and
depression/anxiety symptoms (Ducharme et al., 2013).
Moreover, in addition to speciﬁc involvement of the precuneus in
psychopathology, there is considerable evidence of a link between
psychopathology and abnormal DMN function (see Broyd et al., 2009
for a review).
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The functions which the precuneus appears to mediate in healthy
participants provide further support to its role in TAF. Aside from the
emotions that it elicits, we could speculate that TAF is composed of
cognitive components including (i) (mis)-attribution of personal
signiﬁcance and reference, (ii) (mis)-identiﬁcation of cause and effect,
(iii) sense of agency as being the cause of a disastrous consequence,
(iv) responsibility and obligation to rectify a disastrous consequence,
and (v) in TAF-LO, the belief that harm will come to others rather than
the self (Shafran et al., 1996).
If we ﬁrst consider the attribution of personal signiﬁcance, there
is considerable evidence supporting precuneus involvement in self-
referential processing (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), and furthermore
that the precuneus and the medial frontal cortex (including the ACC)
are both involved in a self-referential network (Fossati et al., 2003;
Johnson et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Vogt and Laureys, 2005)
allowing awareness of the self through the interlinking of personal iden-
tity and past experiences (Andreasen et al., 1995). For example, Johnson
et al. (2002) found greater activation of these regionswhen participants
answered questions relating to their personal traits and characteristics
compared to semantic knowledge questions. In addition, applying
TMS to the precuneus disrupts self-referent judgements, conﬁrming
the importance of the region in such tasks. The precuneus' involvement
in the brain's DMN, particularly the ventral precuneus (Zhang and Li,
2012), is thought to be partially related to its role in self-referential pro-
cessing, as self-reﬂection may be a common aspect of the DMN which
occurs when participants are not otherwise engaged in a task
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001).
There is also some evidence to suggest that the precuneus plays a
role in cause and effect judgements, supporting its involvement in this
aspect of TAF. Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) reported that precuneus
activation accompanies the evaluation of causal hypotheses, Elliott
and Dolan (1998) found increased rCBF in the right precuneus, dorsal
ACC, VLPFC and thalamus during hypothesis testing of a complex, insol-
uble task, and Satpute et al. (2005) found right precuneus activity to
accompany causal, as opposed to associate, reasoning. Den Ouden
et al. (2005) found signiﬁcant activation of the precuneus when partic-
ipants answered questions about hypothetical scenarios relating to the
causal link between their own intentions and actions or physical events
and their consequences. It was suggested that the precuneus/PCC is
speciﬁcally involved in processing intentions related to the self.
Additionally, there is a reason to believe that the precuneus may
underlie cause and effect judgements which are not entirely rational.
In a study by Paulus et al. (2001) a two-choice task was used in which
participants were required to either predict the location in which a
stimulus would appear, in circumstances where no correct answer
existed and reinforcement was random. Signiﬁcant activation of the
precuneus was seen during this task, which was directly related to the
prediction strategy utilised by participants, so that activation was seen
when response selection was not based on previous correct responses
rather than when correct responses were repeated. This then provides
evidence for the precuneus' involvement in processing cause–effect re-
lationships, particularly those which are not entirely consistent with
previous experience. In this way we can see that there may be a role
for the precuneus in thought–action fusion, which involves making
causal inferences which are not based on previous prediction success,
i.e. in the absence of previous experience of thoughts causing events.
Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the precuneus is involved
in ‘free’ decision making, that is, based on entirely internal reasoning
or feeling rather than perceptually or evidence driven (Bode et al.,
2012; Pesaran et al., 2008).
In terms of agency, increased activation of the precuneus has been
reported when participants take ﬁrst-person perspective in a story
(participant as agent) compared to third-person (other as agent)perspective (Vogeley et al., 2001). However, there have been inconsis-
tent results in terms of agency, with other studies reporting greater
precuneus activation with third-person than ﬁrst-person perspective
taking (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Vogeley et al.,
2004), although this has been suggested to be due to the more vivid
representation of the self that may be required in order to imagine
another person in detail (Ruby and Decety, 2001) or mental imagery.
The ﬁnal factor, a sense of responsibility and obligation to negate ca-
tastrophe, also has evidence of precuneus involvement. The precuneus
has been implicated in risk avoidance (Roy et al., 2011) – although see
Paulus et al. (2003) – and has been found to activate when participants
focus on their duties and obligations rather than hopes and aspirations
(Johnson et al., 2006). Further, Johnson et al. (2006) found that partici-
pants' duties and obligations had a greater number of references to
other people than their hopes and aspirations, supporting a link respon-
sibility to prevent harm coming to others rather than oneself. Perhaps
the most compelling support for the role of the precuneus in TAF
comes from the recent studies of Morey et al. (2012) and Cabanis
et al. (2012). Morey et al. (2012) presented participants with scenarios
describing events in which an action by the participant caused a nega-
tive consequence to either themselves or others. They found that in an
other-vs-self comparison, greater precuneus and posterior cingulate ac-
tivity was present when participants imagined being the cause of harm
to another person. Similarly, Cabanis et al. (2012) found precuneus acti-
vation related to the process of attributing causes to the self. Cabanis
et al. presented subjects with sentences describing positive or negative
social situations, and required participants to decide whether the situa-
tion had been caused by themselves or by the other person involved in
the scenario. Their results showed the posterior precuneus (particularly
right-sided) to be preferentially activated during self- compared with
other- attribution. Furthermore, they found activation of the bilateral
insular cortex during the self-attribution of negative vs. positive
situations. This is similar to our previousﬁndings of left insula activation
during visualisation of scenarios following TAF-induction in a negative
vs. a positive TAF condition (Jones and Bhattacharya, 2012).
4.3. The role of upper beta activity in TAF
All between-group differences in the current analysis were found in
thebeta-2 andbeta-3 frequency bands. In contrast to the lower frequen-
cy bands, comparatively little is known about the functional correlates
of upper beta activity. However, it has been linked to both clinical and
non-clinical anxieties, which support a role in TAF: Alterations in the
upper beta frequencies have been found in comparisons between non-
clinical controls and OCD patients (Maihöfner et al., 2007; Velikova
et al., 2010) and schizophrenic patients (Yeragani et al., 2006). Further-
more, synchronized activity in the upper beta band has been found
during modulations of a sense of agency (Kang et al., 2011).
In terms of DMNprocessing, the frequency inwhich our resultswere
found appears to be supportive of activation in this network. While the
relationship between DMN processing and EEG oscillations is complex,
it appears that higher frequencies (in this case alpha and above) are
positively correlated with DMN activation, while lower frequencies
show a negative relationship (Knyazev, 2013). In a study of DMN pro-
cessing using simultaneous fMRI and EEG, Laufs et al. (2003) observed
signiﬁcant positive correlations speciﬁcally between beta-2 band and
BOLD signal in DMN regions including the precuneus, PCC, and
retrosplenial cortex. The authors stated that the activity in the
17–23 Hz beta band is a “signature of activity in the brain network
that underlies this default mode of brain function” (pp.11057).
4.4. Limitations
The results of the current study showed a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between induced TAF and accompanying brain activity
and measures of OCD symptoms and magical ideation. However, as
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infer a direct relationship. Indeed, it is very likely that anxiety and
depressive symptomswould also correlate, and that the relationship be-
tween OC symptoms and TAFwould bemediated by this negative affect
(Abramowitz et al., 2003). However, as the aim of this study was to ex-
amine the neural correlates of TAF as viewed as a pathognomonic phe-
nomenon, rather to identify the personality or symptom dimensions
most strongly associated with TAF, we do not consider this limitation
to reduce the validity of the current ﬁndings — particularly as no
evidence to our knowledge has found qualitative differences between
the experience of TAF-LO found in different patient groups. There are,
on the other hand, likely to be differences between the neural correlates
of TAF-LO and TAF-LS, as well as with TAF-M.
A second limitation is that while the source localisation used in the
current study has high validity of localising cortical sources (Pascual-
Marqui et al., 2002), it is unable to localise activity to deep brain regions;
hence differences in thalamic activity, for example, cannot be ruled out.
An additional limitation of the present study involves the use of two
combined experimental samples: While ‘sample’ is used as a covariate
in all analyses, and there appear to be no signiﬁcant baseline or TAF-
induced differences between samples, this combination may still have
consequences for the statistical analysis and signiﬁcance.
Furthermore, it should be noted that although the High-OC group
scored signiﬁcantly higher than the Low-OC group on TAF-induced anx-
iety, guilt, likelihood and urge to neutralize, their mean scores for all of
these measures was still rather low (b5). This appears to be lower than
those reported by Rachman et al. (1996)who asked participants to use a
verbal scale from 0 to 100, and Bocci and Gordon (2007) who used a
paper VAS with anchors between 0 and 100%. It is possible that the
method of supplying responses in the current experiment (via a
keypad) led to this reduction, as a result of increased time and effort
required to indicate a higher score. Alternatively the use of multiple
trials may have had an effect, either through sensitization over the
course of the experiment, or through a difference in the absolute likeli-
hood of the negative events used. If possible, future studies could use a
single-trial design but with a much larger sample size to avoid these
difﬁculties.
5. Conclusions
The current study provides a novel insight into the neural mecha-
nisms of thought–action fusion. In suggesting high frequency activity
in the precuneus to mediate this phenomenon, the current results in-
crease understanding of the link between brain activity and speciﬁc
symptoms, with potential implications for a plethora of psychological
disorders. Further neuroscientiﬁc research is needed to replicate the
current ﬁndings, and explore the possibility of using this knowledge to
modify the bias.
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